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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
NEW YORK CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation,
lnterven01·,

Case No. 88819

vs .
C. V. LACK and CHRIS E. ATHAS,

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is taken on the judgment roll from an order
of the district court sustaining the defendant Athas' motion
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint herein. For reasons that will
be indicated later, the plaintiff elected to stand upon its original
complaint (R. 21) and took judgment of dismissal as regards
defendant Athas for purposes of appeal (R. 22). Defend-
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ant C. V. Lack appeared in the case and New York Casualty
Company intervened, but neither participate in this appeal.
This action was brought to recover the sum of $37,805.17
which was lost to the State of Utah through the operation of
the Brigham Street Pharmacy Liquor Package Agency in the
years 1946 to 1948. The complaint (R. 1-11) is drafted according to the rules of pleading in force prior to the adoption
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It contains two counts
in conversion, one based upon a partnership theory, the other,
upon a theory of joint venture. For purposes of this appeal
we believe the law to be the same as regards each count. According to the allegations contained in this complaint, the
defendants C. V. Lack and Chris E. Athas operated, at the
times complained of, as a partnership (or joint venture),
a retail drug business in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the
Brigham Street Pharmacy. The complaint further states that
during the time complained of there was operated in this
drug store a liquor package agency for the plaintiff pursuant to a contract between Lack and the plaintiff (R. 1, 3).
The complaint, after alleging the partnership (or joint
venture), sets forth in paragraph 7 of the first count (R. 3)
and paragraph 7 of the second count (R. 5) that "defendants
sold and otherwise disposed of liquor belonging to the plaintiff of the retail value of $37,805.17, for all of which the
said defendants failed, neglected and refused to account to
this plaintiff," but that this sum had been converted by defendants.
To this complaint the defendant Athas addressed three
moti~ns, ( 1) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
4
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relief should be granted, ( 2) for a more definite statement,
and (3) to strike (R. 16-18). The court granted the said
defendant's motion to dismiss as regards each count of the
complaint, sustained the motion for a more definite statement,
and denied the motion to strike (R. 20), giving plaintiff
ten days after notice in which to amend. It is plaintiff's position that this order is in error.
The complaint is an action for conversion. The theory
of the plaintiff is that where a conversion occurs in the course
of operation of a partnership, each partner may be held for
such conversion. We believe the same rule of procedure prevails under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as formerly,
that is that facts properly pleaded in the complaint must be
taken as true under the motions to dismiss. See Nicholson
Transit Co. v. Bassett, 42 F. Supp. 990. Upon the argument
of the motion to dismiss counsel for the defendant Athas
urged two points, one, that there was no allegation contained
in the complaint that defendant Athas had any knowledge
of the conversion or participated therein, and second, that an
action against defendant Athas would not lie in any event
in view of the provisions of Section 46-0-82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which provides among other things, that a
person contracting with the Liquor Control Commission of
Utah to operate a package agency for that commission must
be a "natural person" and that, therefore, no other kind of
"person" could be held accountable to the Liquor Control
Commission for conversion. The argument addressed to the
motion for a more definite statement was aimed at this latter
point.

5
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Plaintiff's position is that if the liquor delivered to the
Brigham Street Pharmacy was in fact handled in the usual
course of business of the partnership known as the Brigham
Street Pharmacy and, if one partner converted a portion
thereof, then_ all partners may be held liable in a civil action
for this conversion regardless of knowledge and regardless
of the statutory restriction as to who may contract with the
Liquor Control Commission as package agent.
This theory is fundamental to plaintiffs position so far
as the defendant Athas is concerned and, rather than amend
it out of the complaint, plaintiff elected to stand upon that
theory and take this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHERE ONE PARTNER, IN -THE COURSE OF THE
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS, CONVERTS PROPERTY OF
ANOTHER, OTHER PARTNERS ARE LIABLE FOR SUCH
CONVERSION, WHETHER THEY KNEW OF OR PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSION OR NOT.

POINT II
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46-0-82, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1943, REQUIRING THE UTAH LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION TO CONTRACT ONLY WITH
NATURAL PERSONS AS PACKAGE AGENTS IS ARE-

6
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STRICTION ON THE POWER OF THE COMMISSION,
AND CANNOT BE USED BY A NON-CONTRACTING
PARTNER AS A BAR TO AN ACTION FOR CONVERSION !\lADE IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION
OF A PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.

POINT III
INFORMATION SOUGHT IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT ARE EVIDENTIARY, AND ARE PROPERLY REACHABLE
THROUGH DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

ARGUMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHERE ONE PARTNER, IN THE COURSE OF THE
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS, CONVERTS PROPERTY OF
ANOTHER OTHER PARTNERS ARE LIABLE FOR SUCH
CONVERSION, WHETHER THEY KNEW OF OR PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSION OR NOT.
As stated earlier, plaintiff's complaint is drawn, as regards
defendant Athas, on the theory that all partners are liable
severally and jointly for the conversions of any partner made
in the course of the operation of the partnership business. It
is plaintiff's position that such a complaint states a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
7
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Section 69-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides:
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of
the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
Section 69-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, further provides:
The partnership is bound to make good the loss:

*

*

*

( 2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person and
the money or property so received is misapplied by any
partner while it is in the custody of the partnership.
Section 69-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides:
All partners are liable:

( 1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under sections 69-1-10 and
69-1-11.

*

*

•

We believe these sections merely state the common law rule
as regards liability of partners for wrongful acts of a partner
in the course of the operation of the partnership business.
This question was considered by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York in the case Brokaw v. Lage et
al., 196 N.Y.S. 531, 203 App. Div. 155. In that case a question
similar to the one here involved was considered. The court
m 196 N.Y.S., page 533, stated:
Respondent also contends that no cause of action
8
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has been stated against this defendant because it is
not shown that Hammond actively participated in the
conversion, but the complaint charges a conversion
during the time defendant Hammond was a member
of the partnership, and, if such is the fact, he is liable
for conversion, whether he knew of it or not. 11atter
of Peck, 206 N.Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1223·, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 798.
In the case of Clark v. Ball, 82 P. 529, 34 Colo. 22;., the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that where one member of
a partnership operating a hotel, absconded with money left
by plaintiff with the hotel for safekeeping, the other partners
are liable for such tort. In the case of Nisbet v. Patton, 4
Rawle (Penn.) 120, 26 Am. Dec. 122, the court held that
a conversion by one partner of promissory notes in t~e possession of the partnership in the course of its business is the
conversion of all partners. The question of the liability of a
partner for tortious acts, including conversion by a partner
in the course of the partnership business, is discussed in an
annotation, in 67 Am. St. Rep. 38, "Liability of one partner
for the tortious acts of another." See particularly page 42
and 43 of that annotation.
Plaintiff in its complaint has alleged the existence of a
partnership known as the Brigham Street Pharmacy. It has
set forth the facts of the delivery to the defendants at- the
Brigham Street Pharmacy of liquor, the property of plaintiff.
Further it has alleged the conversion by the defendants of a
portion thereof of the value of $37,805.17 (R. 3, 5). Whether
the disposition of this liquor occurred "in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership," we submit, is a matter
of proof, and we further submit that, under the law, if the

9
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liquor, the property of the State of Utah, was handled "in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership," the
question of knowledge of or participation in the conversion
by defendant Athas is immaterial.

POINT II
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46-0-82, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1943, REQUIRING THE UTAH LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION TO CONTRACT ONLY WITH
NATURAL PERSONS AS PACKAGE AGENTS IS A RESTRICTION ON THE POWER OF THE COMMISSION,
AND CANNOT BE USED BY A NON-CONTRACTING
PARTNER AS A BAR TO AN ACTION FOR CONVERSION MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION OF
A PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.
Section 46-0-82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides in
part: " * * * the said person (package agent) shall be a
natural person * * * ." Upon the argument for the motion
to dismiss, it was urged by counsel for defendant Athas that
this restrictive provision was itself a protection to action of
this nature against defendant Athas because the contract of
the package agent was between Lack and the Commission,
and, therefore, the Commission must look solely to the contracting partner for liquor delivered to the package agency.
We believe the mere statement of this proposition shows its
fallacy. If this were so, anyone desiring to convert the property of the Liquor Control Commission could, by means of
forming a partnership and having another partner contract
10
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with the Commission as package agent, appropriate liquor
knowingly and intentionally avoid civil liability therefor.
An analagous argument was used by the defendant m
the case of State vs. Lack, ---- Utah ____ , 221 P. 2d 852. It
was urged that in that case that a criminal action for embezzlement would not lie against the defendant inasmuch as
Section 46-0-70 required the consent of the Governor before
an action could be taken against an employee or agency of
the Liquor Control Commission and such consent had not
been obtained. This court disposed of that argument by pointing out that the purpose of that statute was not to place a
restriction upon criminal actions against such employees, but
was rather a limited and conditional waiver of the immunity
of the State and its officials to civil suit. That portion of
Section 46-0-82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, requiring that
the Liquor Control ~ommission contract only with a natural
person is a restriction upon the Commission itself, and we
believe cannot be used as a shield by a non-contracting partner
in an action such as this. If such restriction were to shield
a non-contracting partner for conversion where such partner
had no knowledge of the conversion, then it would follow
that the shield would remain though the non-contracting partner knew of and participated in the conversion:

POINT III
INFORMATION SOUGHT IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT ARE EVIDENTIARY, AND ARE PROPERLY REACHABLE
11
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THROUGH DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
As stated heretofore in connection with the motion to
dismiss, the defendant Athas intetposed a motion for a more
definite statement on the ground that "The complaint, and
each cause, is so vague and ambiguous that this defendant
cannot frame a responsive pleading, * * *" (R. 16). The
motion then sets forth five bases for the alleged ambiguity

(R. 16-17):
a. It is not clear as to which defendant, it is claimed,
agreed to or did operate the package agency.
b. It is not clear whether it is claimed that all the
liquor delivered, or involved, was delivered by plaintiff
to defendant Lack, who was certified as its agent and
employee; or whether all, or part, was delivered by
it to the drug store partnership, or to this defendant;
or whether all the liquor delivered, was delivered to
the same party or parties.
c. It is not clear as to who, it is claimed, "sold and
otherwise disposed" of the quantity of liquor described
(par. 7, both causes); or whether the agent legally,
or the partnership, or this defendant illegally engaged
in this; or whether it or he received any proceeds from
sales thereof; or how, or by what facts or acts of his,
this defendant is claimed to have engaged in these
matters of pure conclusions, as alleged, if it is so claimed. Was his possession given him by plaintiff, or by its
agent, or is the possession of its agent claimed to be
possession by this defendant. Were the matters, alleged
as conclusions, of "sale and disposition," by Lack, as
. plaintiff's alleged agent, or, what is the factual basis
of claim against this defendant. Did he receive, sell,
or dispose of any liquor, or receive any money from
such sales.
12
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d. It is entirely unclear as to what is meant or claimed
by the allegations (par. 7, both causes) that "defendants wrongfully converted the value thereof," and as
to how, it is claimed, this defendant did or could convert a "value" to his own use, and, particularly, a
value of liquor "otherwise disposed of" by someone.
And, also, \vhether, and if so, how, or by what facts or
acts, it is claimed, this defendant had possession of
either property or money of plaintiff, so as to convert
the same, or if this is claimed.
e. The complaint is ambiguous as to whether this
defendant is attempted to be charged here on the basis
of his acts, or on some theory of acts by his agent; and,
if the latter, as to what the factual basis is for charging him with conversion by an agent; and, also, when,
and as to what, and how, or on what theory, the acts
of his agent could or did bind him, as a converter of
plaintiff's property.
As regards paragarph "a" of this motion, we believe it
suffices to state that it is alleged in the complaint that the
Brigham Street Pharmacy was operated as a partnership, the
liquor was delivered to the Brigham Street Pharmacy, and
that the defendants converted this liquor in the course of the
partnership operation. This basis for the motion for a more
definite statement is merely another attack upon the plaintiff's
theory of the case--that all partners are liable for the conversion of one partner in the course of the operation of the partnership business.
As regards .paragraph "b" of the motion set forth above,
we need merely point out that the complaint alleges in clear
and unambiguous terms in paragraph 6 of each count (R.
2, S) that the plaintiff "delivered to the defendants at the
Brigham Street Pharmacy" the liquor converted.

13
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Paragraph "c'~ of the above motion is again addressed to
the plaintiff's theory of the case as set forth ·in the complaint.
That paragraph of the motion is, we believe, aimed at procuring evidentiary matter, which under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure should properly be sought by means of discovery. Furthermore, if thf plaintiff's theory as set out in
the complaint suffices to defeat a motion to dismiss, then the
matter sought in paragraph "c" is immaterial.
We believe the same argument defeats paragarph "e" of
the defendant Athas' motion as set out above.
As answer to the arguments set forth in paragraph "d''
of the motion cited above, we need merely refer the court to
Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules were
in force when this motion was interposed, and, therefore, should
govern the procedure in considering that motion, Rule 1, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. As stated the complaint in this
action was drafted under the procedure existing prior to the
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant
has drafted his motions under the same rules. Had plaintiff's
complaint herein been drawn under the provisions of Rule 8,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then the motion cited above
might well have been considerably more lengthy. This matter
is discussed in 2 :Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., page 2278,
et seq. In speaking of the Federal rules, it is therein stated
(pages 2283-2284) "The framers of the Rules did not intend
that compliance with Rule 8 should expose a plaintiff to a
motion under 12 (e). For purposes of obtaining detailed
information as to the cause of action or defense and of limiting
the issues to be tried, simple and expeditious methods are
provided in Rules 16 and 26-37." See also, Fed. Rules Di-

14
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gest, p. 145 et seq. ( 12e) and Cum. Supp. thereto, p. 41 et seq.
We believe the defendants' motion to dismiss should have been
denied.
CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff's complaint in this action as regards the defendant
Athas states, we believe, a claim against the defendant Athas
for the conversion of the property of the plaintiff by a partnership of which defendant Athas was a member. We respectfully submit that if the plaintiff can prove, as a matter of fact,
that the liquor, property of the plaintiff, was handled and
sold in the course of the partnership operation and a conversion
by one or all the partners was made of such liquor or the proceeds therefrom, then the participation in such conversion or
the knowledge thereof of one of the partners is immaterial.
We believe that a complaint which states such claim is not
subject to a motion to dismiss and further, if not subject to
a motion for a more definite statement. We respectfully submit that the plaintiff's complaint in this case states such a
claim clearly and unambiguously and the trial court in granting
defendant Athas' motion was in error.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
IRA A. HUGGINS,
Special Assistant Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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